E-EMV: Emulating EMV for internet payments using trusted computing technology by Shane Balfe et al.
e-EMV: Emulating EMV for Internet payments using Trusted
Computing technology
Shane Balfe and Kenneth G. Paterson,
Information Security Group,
Royal Holloway, University of London,
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom.
fs.balfe, kenny.patersong@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract
The introduction of EMV-compliant payment cards, with their improved cardholder
veri¯cation and card authentication capabilities, has resulted in a dramatic reduction in
the levels of fraud seen at Point of Sale (PoS) terminals across Europe. However, this
reduction has been accompanied by an alarming increase in the level of fraud associated
with Internet-based Card Not Present (CNP) transactions. This increase is largely at-
tributable to the weaker authentication procedures involved in CNP transactions. This
paper shows how the functionality associated with EMV-compliant payment cards can
be securely emulated in software on platforms supporting Trusted Computing technology.
We describe a detailed system architecture encompassing user enrollment, card deploy-
ment (in the form of software), card activation, and subsequent transaction processing.
Our proposal is compatible with the existing EMV transaction processing architecture,
and thus integrates fully and naturally with already deployed EMV infrastructure. We
show that our proposal, which e®ectively makes available the full security of PoS trans-
actions for Internet-based CNP transactions, has the potential to signi¯cantly reduce the
opportunity for fraudulent CNP transactions.
1 Introduction
The use of magnetic stripe cards for Point Of Sale (PoS) transactions is slowly being phased
out in favour of Integrated Circuit Cards (ICCs) compliant with the Europay-Visa-Mastercard
(EMV) speci¯cations [14, 15, 16, 17]. This process is essentially complete in Europe, well
underway in the Far East, and under active consideration for North America. This major
technology change is motivated by the susceptibility of magnetic stripe cards to cloning,
and the projected fraud losses associated with the continued use of such cards. ICC cards,
having chips that are actively engaged in the transaction authorisation process, are much less
easily cloned. The U.K., which began the transition process in 2004, has seen a 47% post-
migration reduction in PoS fraud [6]. However, with this reduction in PoS fraud has come
an accompanying increase in Internet-based Card Not Present1 (CNP) fraud. For example,
CNP transaction fraud is now the predominant means through which payment card fraud is
committed in the U.K. [5]. Speci¯c ¯gures are harder to come by for other countries, but we
believe the U.K. experience to be illustrative of the global trend.
1For the remainder of this paper all references to CNP transactions refer to Internet-based CNP transactions.
1The level of fraud seen with CNP transactions has raised signi¯cant concern amongst the
card processing community. Over the years a number of proposals have been put forward to
address this problem. The most noteworthy of these are SET [37] and 3-D Secure [49]. How-
ever, neither of these proposals have gained widespread adoption. Indeed, the vast majority of
CNP payments are protected today just using SSL/TLS to secure data in transit and to pro-
vide a limited form of merchant authentication. Customer authentication is provided through
the customer's ability to provide relevant card details such as the Personal Account Num-
ber (PAN) and the corresponding Card Security Code (CSC) over the established SSL/TLS
session.
Thus, from the merchant's perspective, there is no guarantee that the customer is actually
in possession of the card corresponding to the details being pro®ered in a payment transaction.
This problem is exacerbated by the perpetual increase in \phishing" attacks [22]: through
a combination of social engineering and technical subterfuge, customers may be tricked into
revealing their card account details to an attacker. In the past, these attacks have required
some active participation from the user. However, as attacks become more sophisticated,
the human element is becoming removed, with malicious software (malware) residing on a
customer's platform being used to capture customer account details and manipulate customer
transactions (including possibly instigating new transactions). We use the term Transaction
Generator (TG), introduced in [24], to describe such malware in the remainder of this paper.
On the other hand, from the customer's perspective, there is little, if any, assurance that a
merchant will endeavour to protect sensitive cardholder data stored on the merchant's servers.
In a PoS environment, a customer's suspicion may be aroused by environmental cues, such
as damage to the housing of the payment terminal or the demeanor of the sales assistant.
Based on this physical evidence, a customer may decide not to engage in a transaction.
However, in an on-line setting, the environmental (browser-based) cues that are available
are often either poorly interpreted, or not heeded [12]. In an attempt to instill greater
con¯dence in customers, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) [11]
has been proposed. This standard details 12 mandatory requirements that merchants and
third party processors must satisfy. A customer then trusts that a (legitimate) merchant is
in compliance with this standard and has adopted best practice procedures to protect their
credit card details. However, PCI-DSS-compliance levels are still low, and there have been
instances of companies passing a PCI-DSS conformance audit, only to be later shown to
be non-compliant with the standard at the time of a breach [35]. Recently, concerns over
merchants running vulnerable payment applications have become so great that beginning
in January 2008, Visa will begin implementing a series of mandates to eliminate the use of
non-secure payment applications from the Visa payment system [51]. Visa will only accept
payments from merchants using payment applications that adhere to, and have been validated
against, Visa's Payment Application Best Practices (PABP) [50].
In summary, current CNP transaction processing cannot make use of the robust security
features available from EMV-compliant ICC cards, and simply reverts to pre-EMV card au-
thentication procedures. This weakness is now being ruthlessly and increasingly exploited by
fraudsters, and closing this attack vector represents a signi¯cant challenge to the payment
card industry.
21.1 Our Work
To combat the threats posed by malware TGs (and by merchants that are non-conformant
with the PCI-DSS), we propose e-EMV, a system that makes use of Trusted Computing tech-
nology to securely emulate EMV for CNP transactions. We describe a system architecture
encompassing user enrollment, deployment of software cards to customer platforms, card ac-
tivation, and subsequent transaction processing. Our e-EMV proposal uses a combination of
application software, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [45], a processor (with chipset exten-
sions) [23] and Operating System (OS) support [34, 1] to securely emulate the functionality of
a standard EMV-compliant card in software. We provide a detailed description, at the level
of individual TPM commands, showing how this emulation is achieved. We also explain how
the security features provided by Trusted Computing are used to obtain an appropriate level
of security for our system.
Our approach of emulating EMV on Trusted Platforms for CNP transactions provides the
following bene¯ts:
1. It is possible to demonstrate e-EMV card ownership and authentication for CNP transac-
tions as in standard EMV card authentication procedures. Thus a merchant can ensure that
a customer claiming to present a particular e-EMV card is the legitimate owner of that card.
2. A merchant can obtain a payment guarantee through being able to demonstrate customer
authorisation of a transaction.
3. A customer can gain an assurance prior to transaction initiation that a merchant will
endeavour to protect sensitive cardholder information. Such a feature is is absent from EMV's
use at PoS terminals, a fact which is now allegedly being exploited by criminal gangs [48].
4. An executing e-EMV application can avoid the threat posed by malware TGs, by hosting
e-EMV cards in their own isolated memory partition, free from observation and interference.
5. Our proposal supports direct migration to EMV cards that are more powerful and of-
fer enhanced authentication and transaction authorisation procedures, relative to cards used
in current EMV deployments for PoS transactions. While these enhanced security features
(Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) and Combined DDA and application cryptogram gen-
eration (CDA)) are speci¯ed in the EMV standards [15], they are not ubiquitous on today's
EMV ICCs because of their cost implications; instead, some banks ¯nd it more economical
to work with cheaper cards and accept the higher level of risk implied by the use of Static
Data Authentication (SDA) [15]. However, our proposal, involving only software running on
mass-market consumer computing platforms, is not restricted in this way.
6. In e-EMV, modi¯cations and enhancements (resulting from, for example, changes to
the EMV speci¯cations) can be realized through relatively straightforward software update
processes. In contrast, traditional EMV requires complicated and expensive card upgrades
to achieve the same thing. This lends our e-EMV approach an inherent degree of \future
proo¯ng."
The motivation for emulating EMV, rather than designing a new protocol from scratch,
comes from real-world, practical constraints. By creating an environment where EMV trans-
action °ows can be mapped directly to e-EMV transactions we can avoid any expensive
re-engineering of the back-end ¯nancial network. Indeed, our proposal is compatible with
the existing EMV transaction processing architecture, and thus integrates fully and naturally
with already deployed EMV infrastructure. Additionally, as a consequence of EMV having
been developed and deployed over many years, many of the protocol bugs should already have
been ironed out.
3The relative applicability of our approach is obviously dependent on the ubiquity of
Trusted Computing on commodity computing platforms. This is, however, not an unrea-
sonable assumption, and once made, allows a number of interesting solutions to a whole host
of security problems plaguing CNP transactions. Currently available sales ¯gures for 2005
[41] showed estimates of 32% of all notebook systems shipped that year being TPM-enabled.
This ¯gure is expected to nearly triple by the end of 2007, with processor and OS support to
follow soon after [23, 34, 1]. In addition to this, the recently released Trusted Mobile spec-
i¯cations [43] hold particular promise for our architecture, as market penetration of mobile
devices typically occurs at an expedited rate compared to that of Personal Computer (PC)
clients.
Our e-EMV proposal could result in a mutually bene¯cial arrangement for TPM manu-
facturers and card issuers. Indeed, our e-EMV proposal could be a \killer application" for
Trusted Computing in the consumer space, something that seems to be currently lacking.
Organisation: In Section 2, we present an overview of related work. In Section 3, we
provide a brief introduction to EMV and Trusted Computing. In Section, 4 we describe
the payment model used for CNP payments. Section 5 provides a high-level overview of
our e-EMV architecture. Section 6 explains in detail the procedures and processes involved
in establishing an e-EMV card within a Trusted Computing enhanced platform. Following
on from this, Section 7 highlights how a normal EMV transaction °ow can be mapped to
an e-EMV transaction. Section 8 examines how the threats posed to CNP transactions are
mitigated by e-EMV. We conclude with Section 9.
2 Related Work
Herreweghen and Wille [21] present a detailed evaluation of the security requirements for
Internet-based payments. These include: payment guarantee for merchant, mutual authen-
tication between customer and merchant, customer privacy and anonymity, and transaction
authorisation.
The real world roll-out of EMV and the accompanying desire to replicate the fraud re-
duction seen with PoS transactions has resulted in a number of proposals that utilize EMV's
functionality for Internet-based payments [21, 27, 31, 13, 2]. However, these approaches have
not seen any real traction in the market place. A possible explanation for this is these propos-
als' underlying assumption that customers would make use of card readers connected to their
PC platforms. This assumption engenders an additional cost in the form of distributing card
readers to end-users. Even if the cost issue could be surmounted, these approaches alone o®er
only limited security gains. This is due to the lack of a trusted path between the card-reader
and host, as well as a lack of OS support for application isolation. Without these, a TG could
passively observe Personal Identi¯cation Number (PIN) entries, actively modify transaction
data and possibly generate new transactions, enabling criminals to remotely take control of
users' payment cards. There has, however, been a recent development in integrating EMV
with CNP transactions that aims (albeit indirectly) to address the TG issue. This is the
proposed use of \unconnected" card readers [29]. Unfortunately, this approach also su®ers
with respect to the additional costs associated with distributing card readers to end-users
and, once deployed, cannot be updated to address new threats as they emerge.
The use of Trusted Computing to combat phishing has been proposed in [3] and [18]. The
primary threat considered in [3] is external attack, whereby a credential needs to be extracted
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is given to the ever-increasing threat posed by malware TGs. The threat from malware is
examined in greater detail in [18, 25, 24]. Here, much like in our approach, Virtual Machines
(VMs) are used to constrain the use of malware to an individual VM \compartment". These
authors also suggest using visual cues as to the trustworthiness of the VM with which an
end-user interacts, an idea originating in [7]. Such work is complementary, but orthogonal, to
our own: these cues could be adopted in e-EMV and might help enhance customer protection
from TGs.
3 Overview of EMV and Trusted Computing
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the main features of EMV and of Trusted
Computing, providing references for readers who require more detail. This section introduces
many acronyms on which we will later rely, unfortunately this is somewhat unavoidable given
the two technologies (EMV and Trusted Computing) involved.
3.1 EMV
EMV, as described in the current iteration of the speci¯cations de¯nes the full spectrum
of interactions, from the physical to the logical, between an ICC and an ICC-enabled PoS
terminal [14]. A readable introduction to the technical content of the EMV speci¯cations can
be found in [31]. EMV supports both cardholder authentication, through new Cardholder
Veri¯cation Methods (CVMs), and ICC authentication through either SDA, DDA or CDA.
SDA cards allow the terminal to determine if the data on the card has been modi¯ed since card
personalisation. DDA cards are more complex in that they allow for the same checks as SDA
but also enable the terminal to determine if the card is genuine or not through a challenge-
response mechanism. This involves the ICC generating a signature (using a card-speci¯c
private key, with the card storing a certi¯cate issued by the card's issuer for the corresponding
public key) over the terminal-supplied challenge. CDA cards are similar to DDA cards except
the message signed by the ICC includes an additional Application Cryptogram (AC). ACs are
used to protect transaction messages generated by the ICC using AC Session Keys (derived
from a long-term master key, the ICC AC Master Key, that is shared between the ICC its
card issuer). This ICC AC Master Key is unique per card and is derived from a customer's
PAN, PAN sequence number and an issuer Master Key. Here the PAN sequence number helps
to identify a card amongst several cards belonging to the same customer with the same PAN.
EMV de¯nes a number of di®erent types of transaction messages. Depending on the
reconciliation of card and terminal risk management routines one of the following will be
generated by the card: an Application Authentication Cryptogram (AAC), an Authorisation
Request Cryptogram (ARQC), an Authorisation Response Cryptogram (ARPC) or a Trans-
action Certi¯cate (TC). If the transaction is approved, the ICC will generate a TC which will
be passed to the terminal and can be used to claim payment during the clearing process. If
a transaction is declined, the ICC will generate an AAC. In the event that the transaction
needs to be approved on-line the ICC generates either an AAC or an ARQC. which will be
forwarded to the issuer. The issuer will then reply with an ARPC indicating whether the
transaction should be approved or declined, in which case a TC or an AAC will be generated
by the ICC.
53.2 Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing relates directly to the types of systems espoused by the Trusted Comput-
ing Group (TCG). Namely, a trusted system is one which will behave in a particular manner
for a speci¯c purpose. Trusted Computing is based on the inclusion a hardware \root of
trust", the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), within a platform, that aims to allow users
(and third parties) to assess the \trustworthiness" of the devices with which they interact.
To achieve this, a Trusted Platform will be able to attest to its current operating environ-
ment, or any sub-component thereof. Interested second parties can make requests for this
information, and any divergence from an intended operating state can be detected by the
second party, allowing them to make informed decisions as to whether to continue to interact
with the current system. We assume the reader is familiar with Trusted Computing and the
TPM command set, literature for which can be found in [30] and [47] respectively. We now
brie°y outline some of the Trusted Computing functionally upon which we depend in the
remainder of this paper.
Measuring events on a platform is a two-stage process that begins with an extend com-
mand. This command, more commonly referred to as `extending the digest', appends a hash
of the event being measured to one of a number of Platform Con¯guration Registers (PCRs)
located internally to the TPM. These PCRs store a representative hash of all the events gen-
erated so far to form a picture of the current platform state. The second stage in this process
is the writing of events, re°ected in a PCR, to permanent storage. This logging of integrity-
altering events within a platform occurs in the Stored Measurement Log (SML). The SML
maintains sequences of events to which new events are appended. For example, such an event
might be the launch of an application. The measurement of an application can be performed
by computing the cryptographic hash over the current PCR value (to which this event will
be recorded) concatenated with the application's instruction sequence, its initial state (i.e.
the executable) and its input. This hash is then written to the PCR and a description of the
event recorded in the SML.
When a veri¯er wishes to inspect a host platform's con¯guration, it requests (a portion)
of the requestee platform's SML and asks the requestee's TPM to produce a signature over a
speci¯c set of PCR values describing a portion of the platform's operating state. The TPM
uses the private component of a key pair called an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) to perform
the signing operation over the requested PCR values. However, in order for the values being
attested by a platform to have meaning outside of the con¯nes of a challenger's platform, it is
necessary for the challenger's platform to ¯rst obtain a credential for the signing AIK from a
trusted third party recognised by the veri¯er. How this credential is obtained di®ers between
version 1.1b and version 1.2 of the TCG speci¯cations. Version 1.1b uses what is referred to
as the \Privacy CA" model (see [40]) whilst version 1.2 introduced a new (optional) model in
the form of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). We refer readers to [10] and [47] for the
technical details of DAA.
A TPM can manage an unlimited number of cryptographic keys. Every TPM Key [46]
has an assigned attribute designation as well as a de¯ned key type. Attribute designations
help to de¯ne key mobility. A key can be designated as being either migratable, Certi¯ed
Migratable or non-migratable. Migratable keys are unrestricted and are capable of leaving a
TPM, Certi¯ed Migratable Keys (CMKs) require authorisation from a third party in order
to be migrated from one TPM to another, whilst non-migratable keys are inextricably bound
to a single platform. Key types are used to de¯ne what particular operations a TPM Key is
6capable of performing. For example, a key could have a control policy that says a TPM Key is
of signing type or storage type depending on its intended use. In addition, individual private
keys may require explicit authorisation data to be entered by a user before the key can be
used, or require a speci¯c set of platform metrics to be present before the key can be loaded
and used.
To allow a second party to inspect the properties of a CMK or non-migratable TPM Key,
the private component of an AIK (for which certi¯cation of the public component has been ob-
tained) may be used to sign the public component of a TPM Key to produce a TPM Certify Info(2)
structure [46]. This structure contains a digest of the corresponding public TPM Key and
information that describes the control policy for the private portion of this key. This structure
can be sent (with the corresponding AIK credential and public key) to a second party for
veri¯cation.
In addition to the features provided by the TPM, both Operating System (OS) and
processor support represent integral components in the realisation of Trusted Platforms. As
well as providing access to TPM functionality, a Trusted OS will be capable of launching
sandboxed Virtual Machines in which applications can run. A Dynamic Core Root of Trust
for Measurement (D-CRTM) [39], as de¯ned by Intel in their Trusted Execution Technology
(TXT) and AMD in their Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) system architectures [23, 4], refers
to the instantiation of one or more protected Virtual Machines (VMs) running on-top of a
Measured Virtual Machine Monitor (MVMM) [1]. These VMs run in parallel to the standard
OS partition without requiring a system reboot. The following are generic security services
for a protected VM based on an MVMM; we assume the presence of such functionality in our
later discussions.
No interference: Ensures that a program is free from interference from entities outside its
execution space.
Trusted path: Assumes a trusted path between a program and an input device.
Secure inter-process communication: Enables one program to communicate with an-
other, without compromising the con¯dentiality and integrity of its own memory locations.
Non-observation: Ensures an executing process and the memory locations it is working
upon are free from observation.
4 Payment model
The processing model used for most card payment systems (including EMV) is typically
referred to as the four-corner-model. Within this model, a number of steps are necessary to
complete a given transaction (see Figure 1). Prior to a customer being able to interact with a
merchant, it is necessary that they follow some issuer-speci¯c enrollment procedure in order
to obtain a physical payment card. A merchant, likewise, can only accept payments from a
customer if they have preregistered to accept payments for that customer's particular card
type with their acquirer. The dashed line in Figure 1 represents the boundary of the ¯nancial
network domain. Payment processing occurs as follows:
Step 1: The process begins with a customer signaling their intent to purchase goods by
forwarding a payment record to a merchant. In this instance, the actual characteristics of a
payment record di®er depending on the environment in which it was created. For an on-line
purchase, a payment record typically includes the information embossed on the customer's
physical payment card in conjunction with certain merchant supplied information (such as
7Figure 1: Generic model for card processing.
the invoiced amount).
Steps 2-5: These steps occur immediately after receiving the customer's payment record.
They consist of a merchant submitting the transaction details to their acquirer which will
either authorise or reject the transaction based on their interactions with the customer's card
issuer. After this, the merchant will either con¯rm payment or inform the cardholder that
their transaction has been rejected.
Steps 6-9: Based upon the transaction being approved, either as a result of a successful
outcome from steps 2-5 or merchant risk management routines, steps 6-9 represent the account
settlement process through which funds are debited from a customer's account and credited
to the merchant's.
Perhaps the most surprising feature of this model is that a positive transaction authori-
sation does not guarantee payment for a merchant. It is merely an indication that the card
account details being pro®ered have not been reported stolen and that the customer has su±-
cient funds to cover the transacted amount. Indeed, unless the card has been reported stolen,
it is di±cult for a card issuer, and by extension a merchant, to ascertain whether a particular
transaction is fraudulent or not.
Our e-EMV architecture closely follows the generic four corner model presented above.
The only di®erences in our approach are that the communication channel between the cus-
tomer and the merchant is now Internet-based (instead of being based on physical proximity
of card and terminal), and that both card issuers and acquirers must provide enrollment fa-
cilities for their e-EMV clients, separate to the facilities provided for the physical issuance of
an EMV card. For a card issuer this means providing a mechanism through which customers
can establish their e-EMV cards on their platforms. Similarly, for an acquirer this means
providing a facility whereby a merchant can download an application that can interface with
an customer's e-EMV application. In doing so, we assume the presence of a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI), which can be an extension of the one that currently exists for EMV. In this
regard, enrollment facilities should be able to be authenticated by customers and merchants
via public key certi¯cates issued by a particular card association.
8Figure 2: Enrollment procedure.
5 An overview of e-EMV
This section aims to present a high-level overview of our e-EMV proposal. Our overall aim is to
provide functionality akin to that of a standard EMV card by replicating that functionality
through procedures and capabilities natively supported by a host that is augmented with
Trusted Computing. This allows us to provide a secure and extensible architecture for CNP
transactions.
The procedure for establishing an e-EMV card on a Trusted Computing platform is a
two-stage process consisting of an account activation stage and an application delivery stage.
In describing this architecture we are making the following important assumptions, reiterated
from Section 4: we assume the presence of a PKI extending the one currently in existence
for EMV, we assume that Trusted Computing Platforms are ubiquitous within the mer-
chant/customer domain, and additionally, that both processor and OS support are available
to all platforms within this domain. Furthermore, we have the underlying assumption that a
card issuer has already made the decision to extend credit or debit facilities to a particular
customer.
5.1 Enrollment
Enrollment in our e-EMV architecture involves a customer formally registering as a legitimate
cardholder, allowing them to obtain an e-EMV card. Much like enrollment in the traditional
EMV architecture, a card issuer within our system is responsible for enrolling cardholders
as well as later authenticating their transactions (and possibly the cardholders themselves).
Acquirers can be seen as providing similar functionality to their merchant customers. The
stages for establishing an e-EMV card on a TPM-enabled platform are as follows.
Account Activation: Account activation is the process through which a customer becomes
a member of a card-issuer-controlled group. In this case, group membership is indicative of
9a customer activating their account within the system (Figure 2, Step 1a). In the context of
Trusted Computing, this means enrolling with a Privacy CA (see [40]) or optionally becoming
a member of a card-issuer-controlled Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) group (see [10,
47]). This is achieved by the customer demonstrating the presence of a non-migratable TPM-
controlled secret over which certi¯cation is requested, either an Attestation Identity Key
(AIK) in the case of the Privacy CA or a secret value f for DAA.
At this point, the actual binding between the customer and their platform can be es-
tablished through a mechanism of the issuer's choosing. For example, the customer might
provide information supplied to them in the pre-enrolment stage (in which the card issuer
agreed to extend debit/credit facilities), communicated using an out-of-band mechanism. In
addition to this authentication information, a platform will send various platform credentials
(describing the binding of the TPM to the platform) as well as evidence of the existence of
a non-migratable TPM-controlled secret. After receiving this information, the card issuer
performs due diligence in satisfying itself as to the relationship between a customer and their
platform. This is achieved through a reconciliation of the provided authentication informa-
tion with an examination of evidence supporting the existence of a TPM-controlled secret.
If the card issuer is satis¯ed by this evidence, the customer's platform will receive certi¯ca-
tion on their TPM-controlled secret. This certi¯cation will later be used to demonstrate the
customer's membership of a particular card scheme.
Enrollment for the merchant (Figure 2, Step 1b), by contrast, involves satisfying the re-
quirements for payment processing as laid down by the relevant acquirer's Merchant Operator
Guidelines (MOGs). During the merchant enrollment procedure, the merchant's acquirer also
becomes a certi¯cate issuer, again in the context of the Privacy CA or DAA models.
Secure Application Delivery: The customer downloads a small secure application bundle
(Figure 2, Step 2a) that ful¯lls the role of an e-EMV card as well as acting as a guide
through the process of creating/installing the requisite TPM managed keys (Figure 2, Step
2b) [15]. This bundle, once installed will enable a platform to perform electronic transactions
analogous to those carried out by an EMV card at a PoS terminal. Our e-EMV application
contains all the keys required to perform CDA authentication. However, unlike an EMV card,
our e-EMV application will need to provide some of the functionality typically seen in PoS
terminals, particularly when it comes to cardholder veri¯cation (see Section 7).
The merchant will need to download and install a plug-in, similar in applicability to a 3-D
Secure merchant plug-in [49], but capable of emulating certain EMV terminal functionalities.
The most important of these will be the authentication of customer-supplied credentials.
Much like terminals in the physical setting, merchants will require card issuer's public key
certi¯cates in order to verify customer transactions.
5.2 Transaction Architecture
In order for an e-EMV application (card) to be launched, a Trusted Platform's OS sends
an instruction sequence to the D-CRTM to create a new isolated memory partition. The
D-CRTM launches a VM into this newly created memory area, which in turn executes our
e-EMV application, free from observation and in°uence of TGs. For the details of launching
a secure VM, we refer readers to [23]. With the exception of Step 1 (see Figure 3), the basic
°ow for e-EMV transaction processing follows EMV's transaction processing at PoS. The
steps are as follows:
Step 1 represents the browsing phase in which a customer peruses a particular merchant
10Figure 3: Transaction architecture for e-EMV payments.
site. During this step, the customer veri¯es that the merchant is a member of a valid group
of merchants, corresponding to a particular Privacy CA/DAA issuer (acquirer). Additionally,
the customer may verify that the merchant is in a state that exempli¯es an adequate policy for
addressing privacy and con¯dentially concerns (for example, conformance with the PCI-DSS
or Visa's PABP) via Trusted Computing's attestation procedures.
Step 2 represents the typical EMV ICC and terminal interaction, except that the com-
munication channel is now exclusively Internet-based.
Step 2a represents the creation of an AC. As part of this step the customer's platform
generates a signature over its AC (using the certi¯ed non-migratable TPM-controlled secret
established during the account activation phase) as well as the Platform Con¯guration Reg-
ister (PCR) values that provide evidence as to the platform's current state at the time of
transaction authorisation. These data items are communicated over a secure and authenti-
cated channel to the merchant server.
Steps 3 to 7 are executed if the optional decision to go \on-line" has been exercised. As a
result of either terminal or card risk management procedures, the AC (possibly in conjunction
with the information adducing the current platform state) is forwarded to the customer's card
issuer (Steps 3a{4). After examining the received data, the card issuer returns an AC of its
own (Steps 5{7). This AC informs both the card and the merchant as to whether the request
is to be approved or declined, in which case the card application will either proceed with the
transaction or reject it. It is important to note that all e-EMV messages exchanged in Steps
2{7 are standard EMV message °ows that are exchanged between a PoS terminal and EMV
card.
Where additional Trusted Computing platform state information has been added to
EMV's AC messages, it is optional for an card issuer to examine this state information as part
of their decision making process. The Tag Length Value (TLV) encoding mechanism used in
EMV makes it easy for an card issuer to ignore any extraneous information from a transaction
referral request. Signi¯cantly, if the card issuer does decide to take a customer's platform state
into consideration, the customer's card issuer would not need any Trusted Computing facility
to examine these characteristics. It would only need to be capable of hashing some supplied
records and verifying a signature (as we shall see in Section 6). Indeed, such functionality
could be provided by a third party facility or performed by the merchant plug-in.
116 Installing and Instantiating an e-EMV card
This section explains in greater detail the process involved in establishing an e-EMV card
within a Trusted Platform.
6.1 Account Activation
In order for a customer's e-EMV account to be activated, the customer's Trusted Platform
must become a member of a card issuer controlled group. This process is mirrored for the
merchant server account activation procedure with respect to a merchant's acquirer. In both
cases, account activation is achieved by successfully obtaining/generating a credential issued
for an AIK public key. This credential could be in the form of X.509 certi¯cate issued by a
Privacy CA or a credential issued by a DAA Issuer [47].
In discussing the use of a Privacy CA or a DAA Issuer here, we are not suggesting that our
approach should actually bene¯t from the privacy-enhancing features available from either of
these choices. Rather, we see the card-issuer playing the role of either a Privacy CA or DAA
Issuer as providing a convenient mechanism for achieving client-side certi¯cation within the
limitations of the TCG speci¯cations.
In either case, the choice of a Privacy CA or DAA Issuer will end with a similar result:
the customer will have their account activated, later allowing them to demonstrate physi-
cal/logical possession of an active card within the system. Through the establishment of a
customer-centric credential embedded within a platform, the customer will be able to attest
to the existence of a key capable of replicating EMV's SDA/DDA/CDA functionality.
In obtaining this credential, the credential issuer needs to ensure that a request is com-
ing from a particular customer. This can be achieved, for example, through a customer
demonstrating knowledge of a shared secret created in the pre-enrollment stage over a secure
channel. However, the actual mechanism used is orthogonal to our discussion.
6.1.1 Privacy CA Approach
Here the process involves a customer's TPM generating an attestation key pair (SAIK and
PAIK for the private/public portions respectively) and having PAIK incorporated into an
ICC Public Key Certi¯cate (AIK credential). When creating this key, the customer speci¯es
a password for SAIK, which will be required every time the key is loaded for use. The process
involved in the generation of a new attestation key within a platform maps to the generation
of an AIK key within a TPM, that is, as a result of performing the TPM MakeIdentity
command [47, pp.146]. The PAIK portion of this AIK, along with various platform credentials
and customer authentication data, are encrypted with the issuing host's public key and sent
to the card-issuer-controlled Privacy CA. After authenticating a particular customer and
satisfying itself that the request is coming from a genuine TPM, the Privacy CA will issue
an AIK certi¯cate to the customer's TPM-enabled platform. This credential can then be
used to provide evidence of card activation within the system. The AIK certi¯cate could be
further enhanced through X.509v3 extensions. For example, it is possible to add key and
policy information to the credential, such as setting a private key usage period under which
the AIK signing key will operate.
126.1.2 DAA Approach
The DAA enrollment procedure occurs exactly as laid out in [10]. However, here the role
of the DAA Issuer is provided by the card-issuer-controlled issuing host. After a successful
completion of the DAA Join command [47, pp.255], the customer will instruct their TPM
to create a new AIK pair (SAIK and PAIK for the private/public portions respectively). As
part of this key generation process, the customer speci¯es a password for SAIK, which will be
required every time the key is loaded for use. The customer then instructs their TPM to sign
the PAIK component using their newly enrolled DAA key. This will later allow the customer
to be able to demonstrate that their account has been activated with respect to a particular
card issuer.
Subsequent to a successful completion of either the DAA join procedure or upon receipt
of an AIK certi¯cate from a Privacy CA, the card issuer activates the customer's account
within their systems. This enables the soon-to-be-downloaded e-EMV application to be used
in ensuing ¯nancial transactions.
6.2 Secure Application Delivery
The delivery of the e-EMV application to a customer's platform involves an interactive process
between a customer and their card issuer. The delivery of the software itself necessitates a
number of checks to ensure the binding between a customer and their platform. The software
set-up utility requires the inclusion of a unique EMV ICC AC Master Key per card issuance,
and this key cannot be generated by the platform itself as it is derived from an issuer Master
Key. Instead the ICC AC Master Key needs to be injected into the platform as part of the
application delivery process. In addition to the secure delivery of the application, there is
an underlying customer-driven requirement to ensure the authenticity and the \behaviour"
of the application once delivered. The dual concerns of authenticity and \behaviour" can
typically be addressed using what is termed a validation credential in the Trusted Computing
literature [44]. In this way, load-time metrics can be compared against known good values to
assure customers (and merchants) that their application will perform as intended.
The issue of secure delivery of an application using Trusted Computing has previously
been examined in the context of conditional access in mobile systems [19]. However, the
methods of [19] are inadequate for our purposes as we require the card issuer to be able to
specify the state on the customer's platform to which the e-EMV application will be sealed.
Sealed messages in the context of Trusted Computing are messages that are bound to a set
of platform metrics (speci¯ed by one or more PCR values) and can only be opened when the
platform is in a certain state. This is normally achieved with the TPM Seal [47, pp.58] or the
TPM Sealx command [47, pp.78]. However, the TPM Seal and TPM Sealx commands only
allow messages to be sealed locally to a customer's platform. Instead we require a message
to be sealed by the customer's card issuer on their servers, and sent to customer.
In our proposal, the delivery of an application to a customer's platform, as well as the
corresponding requirement of securely storing the application upon receipt, is handled in three
stages. In the ¯rst stage, the customer generates an asymmetric key pair, specifying security
constraints for the private key. In the second stage, the customer sends the public key of
this key pair to the card issuer. The card issuer will then encrypt the customer's e-EMV
application with the customer's public key. In the third stage, the customer decrypts their
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by the platform). The details of these stages are as follows.
In the ¯rst stage, the customer's TPM generates either a CMK or a non-migratable key
pair. The set-up phase of this is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Set-up Phase
1: CI ! C : SealedState k SCI(SealedState) k CICert
2: IC Key := TPM CreateWrapKey (TPM Auth Always, digestAtCreation, digestAtRe-
lease)
3: TPM Certify Info := TPM CertifyKey(IC Key)
Notation: Here CI is the card issuer and C is the customer. SX(Y) denotes a signature
with the private key of entity X over data item Y and Xcert is the public key certi¯cate for
entity X.
In step 1, the customer's card issuer speci¯es a state to which it would like the customer
to \seal" a private key.
In step 2, the customer creates a new asymmetric key pair, IC Key. The customer
speci¯es a password for the private component of this key, which will be required every time
the key is loaded (TPM Auth Always). The customer also speci¯es the current platform state
at the time the key is created (digestAtCreation) as well as the future platform state required
for key usage (digestAtRelease). Here digestAtRelease is speci¯ed to be the SealedState
provided by the card issuer.
In step 3, the newly generated IC Key is certi¯ed by SAIK using the TPM CertifyKey
command [47, pp.128]. Here the customer's TPM is e®ectively producing a signature over the
public IC Key using a signature key that the card issuer knows to be bound to a particular
customer. In this setting IC Key can provide the same level of assurance as results from the
TPM Seal command. This is because the \digestAtRelease" parameter is speci¯ed during the
generation of the private component of the IC Key. In this case specifying digestAtRelease is
semantically equivalent to sealing.
Once the set-up stage is complete, the download of a customer's e-EMV card application
can proceed as follows:
Algorithm 2 Downloading the e-EMV Application
1: CI ! C : RCI k CICert k [Platform Attestation]
2: C ! CI : ECI(TPM Certify Info k ICC Keypub k Platform Attestation k RCI k RC k
SICC Keypriv(C k CI k RCI))
3: CI ! C : RC k EC(e-EMV application)
Notation: Here Rx is a random number, ICC Keypub is the public key of the ICC key
generated in the set-up stage and ICC Keypriv is the private key of the ICC key generated
in the set-up stage. SICC Keypriv(Y) denotes a signature with the ICC Key private key over
data item Y, EX(Z) denotes encryption with the public key of entity X over data item Z, and
X Cert(Cpub) is a public key certi¯cate issued by entity X.
In step 1, the card issuer sends a challenge, its public key certi¯cate and optionally its
own platform state.
In step 2, the customer veri¯es this platform state (if present) as well as their card issuer's
public key certi¯cate. The customer returns the TPM Certify Info structure (generated in
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security constraints (of the private component) of IC Key. In addition to this it sends the
public component of IC Key, signed platform metrics, responds to the challenge of the card
issuer and sends a challenge of its own, all encrypted with the public key of the card issuer.
In step 3, the card issuer examines the received data. Provided the storage semantics for
the private key (IC Key) match the card issuer's security policy and the customer correctly re-
sponded to the earlier challenge, then the card issuer sends a reply to the customer's challenge
and the customer's e-EMV application encrypted with the customer's public IC Key.
The ¯nal stage of the protocol for secure application delivery is application retrieval. The
basic algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 3 Application Retrieval
if (Platform state == digestAtRelease) && (incomingAuth == objAuthData) then
Retrieve application
else
Fail
end if
Providing that the current platform state matches the requirements for the sealed data (as
speci¯ed by the card issuer) and the incoming authorisation data matches the authorisation
data set for the private key during the set-up phase, then the application is unsealed. If one
or both of these two conditions is not met then the application should remain sealed until
both conditions can be ful¯lled. Following a successful delivery of the e-EMV application,
the customer is now able to utilise their card on their TPM-enabled platform.
7 e-EMV in Operation
Once our e-EMV application (card) is launched into its own isolated VM, transaction pro-
cessing proceeds as follows.
7.1 Customer to Merchant Interaction
Customer-to-merchant interaction in our e-EMV system uses the same transaction processing
used for EMV at PoS terminals. Transaction °ows for e-EMV transaction are mapped to EMV
transaction °ows as follows (see Figure 4):
Figure 4: e-EMV Customer-Merchant Interface
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initiated command to select the appropriate EMV application from a multi-application card.
In this case we assume a single application instance in which customer/merchant application
matching is dependent on ¯nding a suitable set of validation credentials supported by the
platform or a reported set of one or more PCR values in the form of a platform attestation,
representing a valid application execution.
Initiate Application Processing: The customer's application next commences appli-
cation processing. In the physical world this would yield a response in which the card returns
its application interchange pro¯le and its application ¯le locator. However, in this setting as
the cards are virtualised and free from the constraints of typical ICC cards, all e-EMV cards
would represent CDA capabilities. Additionally, as part of this step the merchant terminal
plug-in provides to the e-EMV application any terminal-related information pertaining to
the business environment at the point of service. An example of such information would be
terminal capabilities or the country in which the terminal is operating.
Read Application Data: The steps involved in issuing one or more READ RECORD
commands [16, pp.69] in this setting is relatively redundant as we assume the application is
executing solely in main memory on a customer's platform.
Processing Restrictions: This mandatory step is performed by the merchant and
doesn't require any direct interaction with the customer's execution environment. This step
is primarily concerned with judging the compatibility of the e-EMV application with that of
the terminal application. This process can be handled in an e-EMV environment through
a process of reconciliation between terminal supported applications and customer supplied
validation credentials/platform attestation.
O®-line Data Authentication: The three options for o®-line data authentication avail-
able in EMV-compliant cards are SDA, DDA and CDA. These all involve a PoS terminal
issuance of an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command [16, pp.65]. We achieve this func-
tionality in our e-EMV application through the platform's attestation mechanism. We now
discuss how this is achieved for each of the three options.
SDA: SDA is relatively simple process whereby a validation credential (generated by a
card issuer) providing metrics for a correctly functioning e-EMV card application is compared
against load-time PCR metrics reported in an attestation challenge to a merchant. An outline
of this process is as follows (here M is the merchant and Req is a request for one or more
PCR registers:
1: M ! C : MCert k SM(Req) k Req k Platform Attestation
2: C ! M : CCert k EM(PAIK k Platform Attestation)
The merchant server requests one or more PCR values corresponding to the PCRs to
which the e-EMV application is bound. In addition to this request the merchant attests its
own platform metrics for examination by the customer's platform.
The customer's platform examines the attested merchant metrics and determines the
suitability of the merchant for adherence to certain desirable policies, such as the PCI-DSS
standards for card processing or Visa's PABP. If satis¯ed, a customer's platform agent culls
its SML for the events responsible for generating the requested PCR values.
The TPM loads the AIK signing key using customer-provided authorisation data. The e-
EMV application, using the now loaded AIK key, calls the TPM Quote command [47, pp.157]
to sign the requested PCR registers. This will either be the AIK for which a certi¯cate was
obtained during the e-EMV account activation stage (as per the Privacy CA model) or an AIK
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is returned to the merchant server for veri¯cation.
The merchant examines the AIK credential, checks signatures2 and compares a hash of
the SML entries to the attested PCR values. If they match the merchant can be sure as
to the current state of the VM in which the e-EMV application is executing. In e®ect, this
procedure achieves the same function as SDA does in standard EMV.
DDA: DDA requires a slight modi¯cation to the SDA mechanism as outlined above.
During the operation of TPM Quote in which the PCR registers are signed, the customer
incorporates a merchant-supplied 160-bit random challenge to the attestation. This challenge
takes the place of the operand externalData which is of type TPM NONCE [46, pp.27] in the
PCR attestation process.
CDA: In the EMV PoS environment this would consist of a ICC private key signature
over the dynamic application data of which an AC (speci¯cally a TC or an ARQC) and a
random challenge (as per DDA) are integral parts. Replicating this in e-EMV environment
is not substantially more complicated than either the SDA or DDA approaches. The e-EMV
application carries out the AC generation process. The AC, along with its data output
(TC/ARQC) can be integrated into a PCR register. The actual examinable output, that is
the TC or ARCQ, is then correspondingly appended to the SML and a signature is generated
over the representative PCR values. In this way the merchant, upon receipt of the attestation
bundle can examine the SML for the inclusion of an AC and verify its veracity through a
signature veri¯cation.
Card-holder Veri¯cation: In the typical PoS EMV operation, this step allows the
terminal to verify the authenticity of a cardholder. This authentication is based on the
card and terminal both supporting a particular Card-holder Veri¯cation Method (CVM).
In addition to the CVM being used to verify a customer, some CVMs, particularly PIN
authentications, are used as a means of authorising transactions.
Through the use of Trusted Computing functionality we can make PIN authentication
and authorisation intrinsic to transactions. This is achieved through the TPM key authorisa-
tion mechanism, whereby certain keys require 20 bytes of authorisation data to be supplied
prior to being loaded. The AIK key's operation requires authorisation data to be securely
communicated to a TPM. In our architecture, this authentication data will be communicated
over a secure Object-Independent Authorisation Protocol (OIAP) session [45, pp.62]. The
use of an OIAP session allows authorisation information to be sent TPM without revealing
the data on the channel over which it is sent. The availability of such a secure channel is an
adjunct to our assumption of a Trusted Path provided by the OS.
The ability to actually use a key as part of a transaction demonstrates to a merchant that
a CVM has occurred successfully. By verifying the state of the platform, a merchant can be
assured that only a valid customer would be capable of using the AIK/DAA key generated
in the account activation stage.
To prevent malware from launching a dictionary attack against key authorization data, it
is important that the TPM provide some form of resiliency to such an attack. The current
iteration of the TPM speci¯cations [45] detail an example mechanism where a count of failed
authorization attempts is recorded. If this count exceeds a threshold, the TPM is locked and
2There may be a situation in which a merchant is unfamiliar with certi¯cate authority referred to in an ICC
public key certi¯cate. However, provided each card issuer is itself a link in a chain traversing back to globally
recognised root CA, for example Visa or Mastercard, then this veri¯cation can be as a result of certi¯cate
chain traversal.
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at present, the implementation of a dictionary attack resistant authorisation mechanism is
vendor-speci¯c and not always implemented securely [32].
Terminal Risk Management and Action Analysis: The purpose of terminal risk
management and terminal action analysis is to protect the issuer, acquirer and payment sys-
tem from fraud. The existing variety of measures used by EMV in terminal risk management,
such as °oor limits, random transaction selection and velocity checking can all be replicated
in the merchant terminal plug-in in our e-EMV architecture.
Card Risk Management and Action Analysis: Details of card risk management are
proprietary to card issuers and are outside the scope of the EMV speci¯cation and as such
would remain proprietary to individual card issuers within our system.
On-line Authorisation: During EMV transaction processing the merchant terminal
may decide to proceed with an on-line check; this again can be replicated in our e-EMV
environment.
Issuer Script Processing: To allow updates to EMV cards in the ¯eld, the card issuer
can return scripts via the terminal to the ICC for processing. These scripts are not neces-
sarily relevant to the current transaction and may be used to update applications during the
utilisation phase of the ICC's lifecycle, or to transition the card into a blocked or unblocked
state. Updates to e-EMV cards can be performed in a similar manner. An issuer can send
update scripts via the merchant plug-in to the customer's e-EMV card. The issuer can then
distribute new state measurements for updated e-EMV cards to merchants via new validation
credentials. Merchants should only allow e-EMV cards whose attestation matches the values
contained in the latest validation credential to perform e-EMV transactions. Card blocking
scripts are a more di±cult EMV feature to replicate in an e-EMV setting. It may be illegal
in certain jurisdictions for a card issuer to force an update on a customer's platform without
gaining customer consent.
7.2 Payment
As we saw in Section 3.1, in EMV, an ICC uses session keys derived from the ICC Master
Key to protect the transaction messages. In our e-EMV architecture, in conjunction with
the information typically sent in the AC message, the e-EMV application sends the current
platform state as witnessed by its issuer-validated signing key. After examining the AC
message as well as the supplied state, the veri¯er (a merchant or a card issuer) can make a
decision as to whether or not to proceed with a transaction. In the instance where an AC is
an ARQC, as mentioned in Section 5.2, the TLV encoding scheme used in EMV allows the
issuer to ignore extraneous information if they so choose. The card issuer can then respond
with an ARPC indicating whether the transaction should be approved or declined, in which
case a TC (which can be signed, see CDA in O®-line Data Authentication) or an AAC will be
generated by the customer's platform. The transition to Internet-based communications in
e-EMV requires that ACs be protected in transit between the customer and merchant. Such
protection can be achieved by establishing a TPM-centric SSL tunnel between customer and
merchant, as per [8].
187.3 Migration
Enabling the migration of an e-EMV card from one Trusted Platform to another would be
useful in our architecture. We could achieve such a feature by using the TPM's certi¯able
migration functionality. If the customer creates a CMK during the application delivery process
(see Section 6.2), a customer may later migrate their application bundle to another TPM-
enabled platform. However, as neither DAA secrets nor AIK private keys obtained in the
enrollment phase are migratable from a TPM, the customer would need to rerun the account
activation phase (see Section 6.1) in order for their card to be usable on the new platform. In
this instance, the cost of providing additional infrastructural elements to support a trusted
migration service [42] may be somewhat prohibitive for issuers, and it may just be simpler in
practice for customers to enroll their new platform with their card issuer from scratch.
8 Security Analysis
The semantics of trust enforced by Trusted Computing functionality enables both parties,
the merchant and the customer, to obtain certain guarantees that were hitherto unrealizable
in past proposals [37, 49]. Both merchant and server can be sure as to the integrity of their
communicating peer's platform, i.e. that each peer will behave in the expected manner (in
this case, adhere to, and faithfully adduce state characteristics corresponding to legitimate
transaction states). It is important to point out that we do not expect the customer to
be able to recognize or validate software states within our system. This function can be
ful¯lled by the application software itself and should be reported to the customer in a way
that is understandable. This section analyses the e®ectiveness of our e-EMV architecture as
a means of securing electronic payments. This is achieved by examining how well it satis¯es
the security requirements of Herreweghen and Wille [21] described in Section 2.
Mutual authentication of customer and merchant: In our architecture both cus-
tomers and merchants are authenticated via their card issuer/acquirer supplied credentials,
providing a much stronger form of authentication than that currently employed for CNP
payments. Balfe et al. [8] have shown how such credentials can be used to authenticate
the establishment of SSL/TLS sessions, thus providing an additional layer of protection for
the transport of e-EMV transaction messages over the Internet. Their proposal can also be
adopted here.
An added bene¯t of our approach is allowing the customer to examine a merchant's plat-
form state prior to transaction authorisation. This enables the customer to satisfy themselves
that the merchant will behave in a manner that will protect their sensitive card data. Such a
feature is lacking with current PoS transactions, a fact which is now allegedly being exploited
by criminal gangs [48].
Transaction authorisation & payment guarantee for merchant: In our architec-
ture, the use of the private transaction authorising key is contingent on a particular platform
state being present on the customer's platform. Much like PIN entry at a PoS, the comple-
tion of a transaction is conditioned on the input of correct authorisation data, ensuring the
physical presence of the cardholder in the remote transaction. Additionally, as part of the
transaction authorisation process, a customer's platform must attest to the VM in which our
e-EMV application is executing. Any divergence from intended operating state (due to un-
wanted memory resident applications) will be picked up in the attestation, allowing merchant
risk management routines to terminate the transaction.
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CDA. CDA provides a signature over an e-EMV card's Transaction Certi¯cate, providing the
merchant with non-repudiable evidence of payment. Cardholder non-repudiation is dependent
on the degree to which the cardholder's private signing key is securely generated and stored
in the cardholder's Trusted Platform.
Customer privacy and anonymity: Customer privacy is somewhat problematic in
any CNP transaction as the customer will typically provide copious amounts of personally
identi¯able information, such as name and billing address. However, our DAA approach
does provide a degree of pseudonymity for the actual transaction. Provided the customer
selects a fresh DAA identity for each transaction, a customer's di®erent transactions should
be unlinkable by a merchant.
9 Conclusions
The use of the Internet as an avenue for electronic commerce, in the form of CNP transac-
tions, has seen something of an explosion in recent years. However, CNP transactions are
currently far from secure. This paper proposed a new security architecture for securing CNP
transactions. By creating software-based EMV cards running on Trusted Platforms, our e-
EMV proposal replicates many of the features of standard EMV-compliant cards for use in
CNP transactions. Through our account activation and secure application delivery proce-
dures, we established cards can be remotely provisioned within our system. We showed how
card ownership can be demonstrated by the customer through the use of an OIAP session
enabling secure PIN entry. We also showed how EMV transaction messages can be mapped to
e-EMV transaction messages. We demonstrated how EMV keys can be generated and bound
to a particular TPM-enabled platform. Through these various measures, we can achieve a
signi¯cant improvement in the level of security a®orded to CNP transactions.
Our work raises a number of areas for further research. In this paper, we have focussed
on describing architectural and technical aspects of our e-EMV proposal. Our future work
will examine security and system management issues. A prototyping activity based on the
OpenTC framework3 with SVM [4], L4 ¹-Kernel4 and Xen [9] support is also likely to be useful
in terms of revealing unforseen practical issues, operational problems, and the like. At present,
our approach is reliant on MVMMs and Trusted Computing augmented processors being
present in commodity platforms. Unfortunately, such support is not widely available today.
A more immediate avenue for adoption would be Trusted Computing enhanced mobile phones
[43] which do not require MVMM support. However, at present only preliminary details of
the TCG's trusted mobile architecture are available [43]. We believe that Trusted Computing
can provide an enhanced level of security over EMV's deployment at PoS. However, given the
perpetual increase in attacks (both in terms of number and sophistication) targeting end-user
systems, we see an increased role for both terminal and card risk management routines to
control transaction risk in our e-EMV architecture.
Whilst outside of the immediate scope of this paper, in developing our architecture we
note two weaknesses in the current attestation mechanisms adopted by the TCG. Firstly, as
noted in [20], the current TCG attestation is static, inexpressive and has poor handling of
patches and upgrades to system software. Alternative approaches to attestation have been
3http://www.opentc.net/
4http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/
20proposed in [33, 38, 20]. Secondly, the TCG attestation mechanism only concerns itself with
load-time measurements of applications. It is very di±cult to obtain any guarantees of the
run-time behaviour of the application, and as such, applications may su®er from a time-of-
check-to-time-of-use problem. Recent approaches that attempt to address this issue have
been proposed in [26, 28, 36, 38]. Investigating these proposals in the context of e-EMV will
be of interest. In the absence of more expressive attestations we must rely on the properties
of the MVMM to ensure that our executing e-EMV application cannot be interfered with by
outside applications.
We further note the possibility of extending our system by exploiting additional features
of the DAA protocols to support pseudonymous payment cards. In such an extension, we
envisage the information identifying individuals being removed from the merchants' view of
transactions, with acquirers still being able to obtain the necessary payment guarantees. We
leave the details of such a system to the full paper.
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